Philosophy for children and logic-based therapy

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Abstract

This article aims to shed light on the interconnectedness between two important projects in applied philosophy: (a) Philosophy for Children (P4C), a movement for the introduction of philosophy in schools, and (b) Logic-based Therapy and Consultation (LBTC), a widely developed form of philosophical counselling. More specifically, it attempts to show how Michael Hand’s (2018) argument in favour of P4C can fruitfully be enhanced by the endorsement of fundamental theoretical assumptions of Elliot Cohen’s (2005, 2019) LBTC. Hand argues that philosophy should be taught in schools as a mandatory subject by virtue of its distinctive educational value, namely its ability to contribute to justifying subscription to moral, political and religious standards. In turn, proponents of LBTC presuppose the distinctive capability of philosophy to assess and direct subscription to emotional standards, as well as to a broader category of standards, the practical ones. Given that subscribing to all those types of standards is of utmost importance for human life, an argument for mandatorily introducing philosophy in the school curricula starts taking a more concrete shape.

Key words

children, logic, philosophy, reasoning, schools, therapy

1. Introduction

The practical applications of philosophy are characteristically significant for people’s decisions in everyday life, their choices of general ways of living and their emotional well-being. It would also be hard to think of something more valuable than what people
decide in various instances of life, how they choose to organise their living in a more
general way, and the emotional condition in which they are. If these are true, and if
philosophy is teachable even from primary school, then it would sound implausible to
deny that philosophy should be introduced in schools even from the stage of primary
school. For philosophy can equip future adults with the necessary tools for making
justified decisions, living well and staying mentally fine. Moreover, it can help to develop
an expanding profession of philosophical counsellors, who assist clients with the use of
philosophical resources useful for the assessment and guidance of actions and emotional
states.

This article aims to show that Michael Hand’s (2018) powerful argument for the
introduction of philosophy in schools could become even stronger if it is complemented
by foundational assumptions of Elliot Cohen’s (2005, 2019) Logic-based Therapy and
Consultation (LBTC), a prominent form of philosophical counselling. In Section 2, I
present a reconstruction and an assessment of Hand’s argument, which rests on
highlighting the distinctive educational value of philosophy, arguably its power to justify
choices of moral, political and religious texture. In Section 3, I present the fundamental
theoretical assumptions of LBTC and indicate how it can be applied as a
psychotherapeutic process. In Section 4, I show how the distinctive educational value of
philosophy can be considered even more expanded than it is depicted on Hand’s view if
we incorporate the main theoretical suppositions of LBTC within Hand’s position. LBTC
fits well with, and expands, Hand’s view, by invoking the special role of philosophy in
assessing and guiding the emotional and practical reasoning associated with the
production or maintenance of people’s emotional states and dispositions to act. In Section
5, I conclude that Philosophy for Children (P4C), the popular movement promoting
philosophy in schools around the world, together with LBTC, should be seen as ideal
partners, with common vision and interdependent prospects for being successful and
beneficial to our societies.

2. A reconstruction of Hand’s argument

Hand (2018) makes two assumptions which, as he thinks, constitute two reasons why
teaching philosophy in schools looks respectable. Firstly, children can be taught
philosophy and improve their performance on the subject. Philosophy has provenly been
taught for years in the framework of the movement of P4C and it can be adapted at all levels successfully, similarly to how other subjects (e.g. maths, history, physics etc.) can be adapted from primary school to university level. Secondly, similarly to how training in other subjects can be intellectually beneficial, training in philosophy can help children cultivate intellectual virtues useful for improved reasoning, such as the virtue of systematically assessing evidence well and the virtue of becoming better at recognising truth from falsity. Hand claims that those two assumptions do not suffice for showing that philosophy should be introduced in school curricula, because philosophy cannot claim exclusive advantages with respect to the qualities described in those assumptions, in comparison with other school subjects. The argument for the mandatory introduction of philosophy in schools, Hand argues, should be based on the premise that philosophy has a distinctive educational value, different from and additional to the values it shares with other subjects (see also Burgh 2018).

Hand holds that disciplines which can train children to effectively deal with unavoidable problems that are valuable for ordinary human life should unquestionably be part of school curricula. According to Hand, examples of such problems are those about ‘justifying subscription to moral, political and religious standards’ and philosophy possesses a special capability to provide contribution to justifying such standards. Therefore, it is a discipline that needs to be introduced in school curricula.

According to Hand, a standard is a sort of rule, or a norm of behavior, which can be followed, sometimes consciously and deliberately and other times unconsciously and without people’s ability to articulate that they follow it. Subscribing to a standard is a cluster of intending to act by such a norm, feeling well by following it, feeling bad by failing to follow it, and habitually complying with it. Sometimes, when that intention or that feeling or that habitual compliance is missing, one can speak of partial subscription to a standard. In other words, a standard is a specification of something to be done—similar to the form of a command—and subscription to it involves at least one’s partial commitment to doing what the specification involves.

As Hand claims, we regularly care about the standards to which we subscribe; we feel pride about following them or guilty about not following them, and it is always sensible

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1 Winstanley (2018) and Worley (2018) emphasise the power of philosophy to develop children’s metacognitive skills, and Cam (2018) calls for further empirical research on the benefits of P4C.
to ask whether (upcoming) subscription to a particular standard is justified or not. Moreover, beliefs about whether subscription to particular standards is justified or not can be rationally assessed: sometimes the reasons that we have for believing whether subscription to a given standard is justified or not are readily accessible to us.\(^2\) However, oftentimes such reasons are not so easily accessible. This happens in the cases of subscribing to moral, political and religious standards.\(^3\) Following moral, political and religious standards has wide, important implications for our lives, so the problem of justifying subscription to them is inevitable and significant for human life. Finally, adjudicating whether we are justified or not in believing that one should or should not subscribe to such particular standards requires the distinctive contribution of philosophy.

We can reconstruct Hand’s proposed argument as follows:

1. If a discipline can train future adults to effectively deal with problems that are unavoidable and crucial for ordinary human life, then it should be part of school curricula.

2. Justifying one’s subscription (or avoidance of subscription) to moral, religious and political standards is one group of problems that are unavoidable and crucial for ordinary human life.

3. The special contribution of philosophy is necessary for solving problems related to justifying one’s subscription to moral, religious and political standards.

C. Therefore, philosophy should be introduced into school curricula.

Assuming that an essential aim of education is to prepare children for the adult life, premise 1 looks plausible.\(^4\) It would not be an efficient use of future adults’ time if schools prioritised subjects that do not offer anything useful. Moreover, in cases where at least

\(^2\) For instance, think of the subscription to the standard that commands ‘Fasten your seat belt while you are driving’ (compare Hand 2018). Appealing to your safety or to your fear that you will get a fine seem to be easily accessible responses to answering why you should subscribe to that standard.

\(^3\) For example, think of potential subscription to the standards commanding ‘Eat no meat’, ‘Vote for liberalist representatives’, ‘Believe in no god’ (compare Hand 2018).

\(^4\) See Hobbs (2018), whose argument for P4C also presupposes another important educational aim, i.e. a well-lived childhood.
two subjects offer something useful, those subjects which offer solutions to problems inevitable and crucial for human life are preferable, given efficiency criteria.\(^5\)

Premise 2 holds that providing good reasons for believing that one should or should not follow particular moral, political or religious standards is unavoidable and crucial for human life. Intuitively, the plausibility of premise 2 derives from the centrality of people’s subscription to such standards in human life (source 1) and the importance of appropriately justifying such standards (source 2).

Concerning source 1, subscription or avoidance of subscription to such standards looks ubiquitous (see also Hand 2018). Just by complying with the laws of a state, or by voting for specific politicians, we make conscious or unconscious political choices which demonstrate our subscription to certain political standards. Just by adopting certain dietary habits for reasons relevant to our relationship with other beings—say by eating no meat due to our concern for the life of animals—we subscribe to moral standards against meat consumption. Followers of religions subscribe to religious standards, by choosing certain lifestyles in accordance with the rules prescribed by their religions. Subscription to all those standards explains or guides either wide or narrow aspects of human behavior. In wider contexts, such subscription may provide general life guidance or explanations of people’s general ways of living. In narrower contexts, it may explain or affect more specific choices and actions, which of course may in turn depend on subscription to standards in wider contexts. Subscribing for instance, more widely, to utilitarian standards could guide one in a narrower context to decide to implement a social policy which benefits the well-being of the majority of the citizens, even if this policy results into considerable costs for a small minority of the population.

Concerning source 2, Hand acknowledges that the processes of justifying subscription to the aforementioned standards is crucial for human life because people are unavoidably confronted with conscious choices of subscription among such standards. Moreover,

\(^5\) In this article, I assume that there can always be available space in curricula, when it comes to subjects which satisfy the efficiency criteria. I also think that even if the issue of the lack of available space arose, subjects which would tackle more crucial and inescapable problems than others, and which would do so in a distinctive manner, would have to be prioritised. Furthermore, while one can wonder how exactly we could compare school subjects with respect to those properties, the answer to this problem requires philosophical work. So, if people are to answer this question as adult philosophers, then they would be better to start philosophical training from a young age.
those conscious choices, Hand claims, can affect both one’s own life, as well as the lives of others. In addition to the reasons adduced by Hand, justifying subscription to such standards should be seen as important if we desire to be rational beings, i.e. beings who desire, intend and attempt to take decisions based on the best possible considered reasons in support of their actions. I will not delve into the complex issue of defining rationality in further detail as I assume that the above characterisation of rationality should suffice for current purposes, making justice to why we appreciate rationality over irrationality. The desirability of rationality as characterised above could be appreciated by reflection on:

(a) cases of disagreement about issues solvable on the basis of evidence and appropriate reasoning, and not on the basis of personal preferences and taste (we tend to attribute more credit to the proponents of the most rational sides of such disagreements. Pertinently, numerous moral, political and religious issues are solvable only by means of rational reflection or rational debate)

(b) cases where a subject S₁ subscribes to a particular standard after deliberation on the reasons in support of such subscription, while a subject S₂ subscribes to the same standard without deliberation, and where, firstly, both subjects were in position to deliberate relevantly and, secondly, subscription to that standard widely affects those subjects’ lives. (people seem motivated to appreciate S₁’s behavior more than S₂’s).

Premise 3 effectively carries the heavy load of Hand’s argument. It intuitively identifies the distinctive educational value of philosophy with the special contributing role of philosophy in solving problems about justifying subscription to the types of standards discussed so far. Firstly, philosophy specialises more than any other theoretical field in the analysis of concepts in the most detailed, coherent and deep way possible, as well as in the most rigorous study and production of arguments which aim to justify a variety of claims about what there is in the world and how people should act. Secondly, those who seriously try to come up with reasoned solutions for problems about justifying subscription to the aforementioned standards sooner or later realise that those problems require the decisive assistance of philosophy. Successful, rational solutions to those problems are subject to concept analyses and argumentative methodologies which cannot
be followed without philosophical aid. What is, if there is any, the ultimate ground for morality? How should societies be organised? How should one live? What are the aims of education? Should I believe in God, and if yes, why? What entities are there out in the world? Those important questions will be certainly encountered during the endeavor of justifying subscription to the standards we have so far discussed, and those questions certainly need philosophical engagement.

Given that the above premises altogether support the claim that philosophy should become a mandatory subject in schools, we can proceed with offering an even more powerful, updated version of Hand’s argument. To this end, we will explore how the rising form of philosophical counseling called LBTC can be considered as reinforcing Hand’s argument by invoking the distinctive contribution of philosophy to assessing and justifying people’s emotional and practical reasoning.

3. Logic-based therapy and consultation (LBTC)

LBTC is a form of counseling developed by Elliot Cohen in the 1980s and intended as an applied field of interaction between psychological therapy and philosophical practice. LBTC is seen as the philosophical advancement of Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), a modality of psychological therapy developed by Albert Ellis in the second half of the twentieth century and especially inspired by stoicism (Cohen 2004). LBTC is practiced today either as a complementary, philosophical aid to the therapy sessions delivered by psychologists and psychotherapists, or as an autonomous form of philosophical counseling, employed by professionals with some sufficient philosophical background, and informed by the theoretical and applied knowledge from the established fields of psychological counseling and psychotherapy. The characteristic feature of LBTC is the provision and employment of philosophical tools which can promote the clients’ emotional well-being and assist them with making effective and justified practical decisions (Cohen 2004, 2005, 2019).

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6 Even the school curricula themselves officially promote, advertise and aim at results (e.g. compassionate people, flourishing, etc.) whose notions require philosophical analysis and engagement (D'Olimpio & Peterson 2018). Furthermore, on their foundations, all subject areas encounter problems which can be resolved only by philosophical methodology (Cam 2018).
A crucial theoretical assumption of LBTC is that one’s emotions may partly be constituted both (i) by cognitive components that can act as the end results of one’s emotional logical reasoning and as the input material of one’s practical logical reasoning, which leads to intentions or dispositions to act, and (ii) by behavioral components which are the end results of one’s practical logical reasoning, in the form of the aforementioned intentions and dispositions (Cohen 2005). Think of the belief that I am an unworthy person (B1), deduced from the belief that I failed a job interview (B2) and from the belief that if I fail an interview, then I am an unworthy person (B3). B1 is arguably a cognitive component of an emotion and arose from one’s emotional reasoning—say the emotion in this case is sadness about failing a job interview. In turn, B1 can be used as input material for deducing that I should never make a job application again (B4) (i.e. B1, and if B1, then B4. Therefore, B4). B4 is the end result of my practical reasoning and constitutes part of a disposition or intention to never make a job application again. That intention or disposition is arguably part of the same emotion, i.e. the emotion of feeling sad about failing a job interview.

LBTC holds both that one’s practical reasoning, as well as the emotional reasoning on which the practical reasoning hinges, may contain fallacies and that people’s emotional and behavioral problems could often be solved by the adjustment of those forms of reasoning (Cohen 2005). Moreover, LBTC holds that people possess an intrinsic capability to control or revise the types of logical reasoning which can shape their emotions and behavior (Cohen 2005).

Let us examine a bit more how LBTC views the structure and nature of emotions. Firstly, Cohen (2005) adopts a widely shared assumption in the literature: the intentionality, or ‘aboutness’, of emotions, i.e. the assumption that there are objects (e.g. states, facts or situations) emotions are about (see also Johnson 2020). Someone may be angry about having been fired from their long-term position, someone else may be sad about having been betrayed by their spouse, and someone else may feel scared about the prospects of failing to make the audience laugh at their next stand-up comedy show.

Secondly, Cohen holds that one’s emotion E can be identified by (but does not exclusively consist of) the distinct combination between its intentional object O and one’s evaluation or rating R about O (or about some aspect of O). In this picture, one’s emotion E is partly constituted by the conjunction O + R. Moreover, Cohen holds that R about (some aspect of) O can be logically inferred with the help of a rule which is implicitly or explicitly
endorsed by the subject S of the emotion and helps S implicitly or explicitly complete S’s evaluation R about (the particular aspect of) O.

Suppose that I feel anxious about potentially failing my geography exam tomorrow. The object O of my emotion E is the potential failure in my tomorrow exam. My evaluation R about O is that I should be seriously worried about it. The Rule that contributes to shaping my R about O is the Rule ‘If O, then R’. Here is how my emotional reasoning can be unfolded:

**Emotional reasoning 1**

O: There is a chance that I will fail my geography exam tomorrow.

Rule: If O, then I should be seriously worried about the possibility that I will fail.

R: Therefore, I should be seriously worried about the possibility that I will fail my geography exam tomorrow.

R is a cognitive component of my E. It is the conclusion, or else inferential output, of my emotional reasoning, whose inferential inputs are the premise O and the Rule. Moreover, R can also serve as inferential input for further reasoning of mine, which can take R as one of its premises and can result in a further conclusion. When the latter conclusion takes the form of a practical judgment PJ which is associated with a relevant disposition or intention D to act, then the reasoning from R to PJ is a case of practical reasoning. Consider the following example:

**Practical reasoning 1**

R: I should be seriously worried about the possibility that I will fail my geography exam tomorrow.

Rule: If R, then I should give up the exam.

PJ: Therefore, I should give up the exam.

My practical reasoning ends up forming the practical judgment PJ which is associated with a corresponding disposition or intention D of mine to act according to PJ. The character of D is determined by PJ, and D will be actualised if nothing prevents that
actualisation. Irrespective, though, of whether I actually perform what D disposes me to do, D constitutes a behavioral component of my emotion of anxiety about O.

The above picture of emotions is not unquestionable (see Zinaich 2005). The variety of human emotions may demonstrate a more complicated and richer, or quite different, nature and structure (see Scarantino & Sousa 2018; Johnson 2020). Nevertheless, here I presuppose that the view of LBTC correctly describes certain aspects of many emotions, without examining relevant objections. Now, let us see the stages the LBTC practitioner aims to follow in order to alleviate the emotional or practical difficulties of the clients.

Firstly, the practitioner cooperates with a client with the aim of constructing, or better *discovering*, the client’s emotional or practical reasoning (compare Cohen 2019). The practitioner’s basic purpose here is the use of effective dialogue so that the client understands possible interpretations of their emotional or practical reasoning, which causes emotional or practical problems.

Then, the practitioner needs to identify and communicate to the client potential flaws in the client’s reasoning. In accordance with possible flaws in one’s normal inferential reasoning from belief to belief, the same types of flaws can be spotted in one’s emotional or practical reasoning (compare Cohen 2019). Two major types of possible inferential flaws which might sometimes appear together are these:

A. At least one of the premises of the reasoning is false or inconsistent with further background information of the subject or is produced itself by prior defective reasoning.

B. Even if all the premises of the reasoning are (or were) true or appear (or appeared) plausible or are (or were) produced by prior non-defective reasoning—and presupposing absence of further counterevidence against the content of the premises—the conclusion of the reasoning does not (or would not) necessarily follow from the premises, or it is not (or would not be) probable given the premises.

In analogy with (A) and (B), two core types of possible flaws in one’s emotional or practical reasoning can be the potential inappropriateness of at least one of the premises (i.e. of O or of the Rule), or the fact that R does not necessarily follow from the premises.
even on the assumption that the premises are true. Sometimes, both types might appear together.

Recall *Emotional reasoning 1*. Its problem lies in the inappropriateness of the Rule. Holding that *if there is a chance of failing in my geography exam, then I should be seriously worried about it* looks wrong. As a counterexample, the fact that there is a chance that your bus to work will be involved in a car accident is not a good reason for you to get seriously worried about it. Thus, R about O is the result of defective emotional reasoning. By virtue of this, R is also an inappropriate premise for *Practical reasoning 1*.

Consider now a case of emotional reasoning where, despite the appropriateness of the premises, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from them.\(^7\)

*Emotional reasoning 2*

O: I have been very successful and lucky so far in my life when it comes to financial prosperity and fulfilling relationships with people.

Rule: If O, then one should feel happy about and grateful for one’s financial and relationships situation.

R: Therefore, I should feel anxious about potentially becoming unsuccessful and unlucky in the future, with respect to my financial and relationships situation.

Suppose that O is true. The Rule looks plausible too. The problem is that, from a logical point of view, R does not necessarily follow from, or is not probable, given the truth of O and the Rule. In fact, R seems to be irrelevant to what is expected, given the truth of O and the Rule. As one can argue, the fact that you should be happy about some situation neither entails nor indicates that you should also be anxious about losing whatever makes you happy about that situation.

\(^7\) Notice that both R and the Rule of *Practical reasoning 1* are problematic. R is the result of defective emotional reasoning and the Rule looks implausible: When one should be seriously worried about the likelihood of failure at some activity, one should not necessarily stop trying to succeed in that activity.

\(^8\) Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer of the journal for pointing out to me the need of replacing the example that I had initially written with another example, more plausible in psychological terms.
Similarly, the basic types of possible flaws in one’s practical reasoning can be the inappropriateness of its premises, and the fact that the conclusion PJ of the practical reasoning does not necessarily follow from, or is not probable, given its premises, even on the assumption that the premises are appropriate.

Actually, Cohen (2019) offers a list of 11 more specific paradigm types of flawed reasoning, such as (a) one’s demanding that the world be perfect; (b) one’s exaggerating the badness of a situation; (c) one’s basing conclusions on subjective attitudes (e.g. fear, hopes, etc.) rather than on objective, scientific criteria. While Cohen’s analysis is fruitful and informative, given the variety of specific types of flawed reasoning that he proposes, I will leave to the reader to explore how those specific types can be translated into the more abstract presentation of the aforementioned more general possible flaws (A) and (B) discussed in this section. After all, any specific fallacy of reasoning must, in one or the other way, derive from (A) or (B) or both.

In any case, the final stage of LBTC involves the practitioner’s attempt to offer the client an antidote for their irrational reasoning. Cohen (2019) helpfully matches each specific type of fallacy that he suggests with a potential corresponding type of antidote (e.g. If one’s reasoning suffers from basing conclusions on fear, a possible antidote is the adoption of the attitude of being more careful in giving proper weight to available evidence). More abstractly, but compatibly with Cohen’s proposed antidotes, I suggest that LBTC practitioners can construct their own antidotes either by substituting the inappropriate premises with (more) appropriate ones, or by putting forth alternative lines of reasoning characterised by a better logical relationship between the conclusions and the premises.

One apparent problem about the final stage of LBTC is that most (if not all) premises and lines of reasoning that could be proposed as parts of the supposed antidotes might be philosophically questionable (see Fraser 2005 for remarks on conflicts among potential antidotes; see also Zinaich 2005 for potential conflicts between antidotes and the clients’ worldviews). After all, fundamental philosophical problems have been under exploration since antiquity and, given the progress of contemporary analytic philosophy, the meaning and the credibility of even the most widely acceptable and established claims and notions—even logical and mathematical ones—are under philosophical investigation. Consequently, there is a possible danger that any proposed antidote might be per se questionable, or even questioned and rejected by the client (e.g. clients who
deny that there are moral values independent of people’s desires and attitudes might reject an antidote which contains the premise that they should be fair to their colleagues while advancing their own careers). So, a client could be left unsatisfied with the improvement of their reasoning and their emotional situation. They might also feel incapable or indifferent to doing, or participating in, the philosophical work of justifying a relevant questionable premise of an unsatisfying antidote (see also Zinaich 2005).

In reply, LBTC does not necessarily aim at the proposal of universally accepted or indubitable premises (see Fraser 2005). Actually, contemporary analytic epistemology has made a shift from demanding the infallibility of our beliefs as the ultimate epistemic aim to accepting the fallibility of our beliefs as a natural, unavoidable consequence of our cognitive architecture (see Hetherington 2020). A suitable aim of LBTC can be the proposal of lines of reasoning that (i) fit with each client’s different background mental states, preferences and worldview, and (ii) contribute to the clients’ attempts to overcome their emotional and practical difficulties (see also Fraser 2005).

Moreover, even if some suggested antidotes are questionable, it is not certain that the client will think so or care about it. In case the client thinks so, LBTC could still be beneficial if they realise that they cannot improve their reasoning unless they proceeds with further philosophical inquiry. It is also by no means plausible to claim that their further engagement with philosophy will necessarily maintain or amplify their emotional difficulties. Their engagement with philosophy—perhaps as a stance of life—might constitute the antidote itself. Moreover, even if the client acknowledges that further philosophical inquiry is not suitable for them, this acknowledgment can still work as a credible and helpful premise of their reasoning. At any rate, LBTC will have contributed towards their understanding that their prior emotional or practical reasoning was inappropriate and disturbing for their emotional well-being.

As an important remark, although LBTC provides an interesting theoretical framework for the development of a philosophical psychotherapeutic modality, its exact results, its presumed benefits and the type of clients to which it can helpfully be applied require confirmation and clarification by empirical investigation (see Amir 2004). Given the affinities between LBTC and psychotherapeutic modalities such as the Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), I have assumed in this paper that it is highly probable that such empirical investigation would provide the necessary confirmatory evidence and suitable clarifications.
4. How LBTC supports P4C

So far, we have examined Hand’s argument for the introduction of philosophy in schools, as well as the most important stages and theoretical assumptions of Cohen’s LBTC. Hand’s argument for the introduction of philosophy in schools is grounded—among other plausible claims—in the claim that philosophy possesses a distinctive educational value, which is derived from its capability to distinctively contribute to one’s justified subscription (or avoidance of subscription) to moral, political and religious standards. In turn, LBTC is a form of counselling which holds that philosophy can distinctively help people improve their emotional states and decisions, via upgrading their fallacious emotional and practical reasoning. It could intuitively be argued that LBTC practitioners attempt to help their clients to consciously subscribe to more appropriate or justified emotional and practical standards, which serve as premises and conclusions of their emotional and practical reasoning.

Presupposing that the assumptions of LBTC are credible, it becomes intuitive that Hand’s argument has the potential to become even more powerful. This can happen if his argument accommodates the idea that the distinctive educational value of philosophy is even more widespread than what the argument initially suggested. Apart from being distinctively capable of justifying moral, political and religious standards, philosophy is arguably distinctively capable of justifying emotional and practical standards as well, hence being beneficial for people’s emotional well-being. While I will leave to the reader and to further research to explore how exactly moral, political and religious standards are related to emotional and practical standards, it is intuitive to treat the premises and the conclusions of people’s emotional and practical reasoning as emotional and practical standards. Based on all observations above, let us now see a modified and more powerful version of Hand’s argument:

1. If a discipline can train future adults to effectively deal with problems that are unavoidable and crucial for ordinary human life, then it should be part of school curricula.

2. Justifying one’s subscription (or avoidance of subscription) to moral, religious and political standards is one group of problems that are unavoidable and crucial for ordinary human life.
3. Justifying one’s subscription (or avoidance of subscription) to emotional and practical standards is another group of problems that are unavoidable and crucial for ordinary human life, by virtue of the consequences of such subscription to emotional well-being.

4. The special contribution of philosophy is necessary for solving problems related to justifying one’s subscription to moral, religious, political, emotional and practical standards.

C. Therefore, philosophy should be introduced into school curricula.

The above slight modification of Hand’s argument—as well as Hand’s original argument—can serve as important support for the introduction of philosophy in school curricula, either as a distinct subject, or at least as a more extensively applied, pedagogical methodology for teaching other school subjects (see Burgh 2018 for a view of philosophy as pedagogy for promoting democracy; D’Olimpio & Peterson 2018 for the role of narrative artworks in cultivating philosophical education; Hobbs 2018 for the educational benefits of ancient Greek philosophy and for ways in which it can be part of school curricula). LBTC illuminates a further aspect of the proposed distinctive educational value of philosophy: philosophy can train people to learn how to improve their emotional and practical reasoning, hence how to attain and maintain emotional well-being. If, through philosophy, people can learn how to pursue emotional well-being, then it would be better for them to start learning how to do it while still being in primary school.

5. Conclusions: The mutual support between P4C and LBTC

In conclusion, if the theoretical assumptions of LBTC are incorporated within Hand’s argument for P4C, Hand’s argument is enhanced, so our theoretical support for the extensive introduction of philosophy in schools—even in primary ones—becomes even more solid. Moreover, if the emotional benefits of LBTC are confirmed by widespread empirical use of it by professionals who work at the intersection between philosophy and psychology, LBTC could also have a practical, beneficial effect on the movement of P4C. It could gradually cause a positive shift of opinions in the public sphere about the usefulness of philosophy, showing the need for the extensive inclusion of philosophy in schools at all levels.
Simultaneously, it is P4C which can provide LBTC with practical help. The extensive introduction of philosophy in schools can form the basis of the training of future mental health professionals and philosophers who will work as philosophical consultants. Moreover, the extensive introduction of philosophy in schools can render philosophy and philosophical consultancy more familiar to the public, hence paving the way for the development of more career opportunities for philosophers. For instance, LBTC practitioners will look more respectable to the public while applying philosophical methodology to help their clients, and philosophy teachers will be in increasing demand by the schools and universities in order to train future adults with philosophical skills and future professional philosophers.

In any case, the success of both movements looks at least partially dependent on the mutual support between each other, as well as being valuable for the individuals and for the society as a whole. If we envision a society of individuals who are trained to take care of their emotional well-being and to make well-reasoned and justified decisions in all essential matters of their lives, then philosophy appears to be integral for the accomplishment of that vision.

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